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THE SEMINAL ISSUE IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION: REAPPORTIONMENT METHOD AND
STANDARDS
ROBERT

G. DIXON, JR.*

AND
GORDON W. HATHEWAY, JR.**
INTRODUcTION

The making of a constitution is a great effort which cannot be oftrepeated with any assurance of sustained public interest, or disposition
to seek the purified "general will" of Rousseau rather than the common
will of current desire. And yet, the constitution-making process is
normally viewed as the ultimate affirmation of the principle of government by the consent of the governed. No other central premise is
consistent with the basic tenets of democratic theory. To be sure, particular policy responses to shifting public needs are not made by the
constitution-forming process, but the institutional basis for making these
responses is grounded on the formal constitution.
Once past the stage of constitution-making, we look to the legislature-a deliberative body serving both as guardian and as articulator
of the "public interest"-for continuance of the consent basis for government. How well the legislature discharges this dual role is conditioned
by a plurality of factors. Beyond the reach of constitution-makers is
the degree of that public spirit which the Greeks, for lack of a better
term, called "virtue." Within the reach of constitution-makers are
formal matters of legislative structure and reapportionment methods
and standards-matters which, if properly handled, can transform the
popular consent principle into a continuing process of fair and effective
representation, and which, if improperly handled, can enshrine parochial
interests and the status quo of yesterday.
In short, one moves in a direct line from constitution-making to provision for an effective legislative organ, and to effectuation of the popu*Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. Reapportionment consultant to New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland constitutional conven-

tions.
**B.S., 1965, Bucknell University; J.D., 1968, George Washington University Na-

tional Law Center. Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
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lar will through that organ.1 An effective legislative institution provides
the highest assurance that other state governmental matters will be disposed of well. For this reason Chief Justice Earl Warren has said that
the initial reapportionment decision in Baker v. Carr,' rather than the
desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education,3 was the most
important decision of the Warren Court. He said in a 1968 interview
that many of the problems that now confront the nation could have
been disposed of earlier if the legislatures had been properly apportioned before the Supreme Court required it 4
When we move to the specifics of "properly apportioned" state legislatures we find that, contrary to popular impression, the Supreme Court
to date has done little more than require an unspecified degree of population equality. The justiciability of political gerrymandering, the constitutional range of districting options and at-large voting procedures,
,possible tests of fair and effective representation (including minority
representation)-all these and more are open questions leaving much
room for maneuver at the state level. Two cases concerning congressional districting in New York and Missouri scheduled for oral argument in the Supreme Court early in 1969 may throw some light on the
"equality" and "gerrymandering" issues, but are unlikely to resolve
them."
This article discusses continuing reapportionment problems under
the two headings of apportionment method, with particular focus on
bipartisanship, and state constitutional apportionment standards. Arithmetic equality alone provides no certain direction to apportionment
now that the basic "suburban"-"rural" redistribution of seats has been
achieved, more or less, in most states. (Most big cities change little
under reapportionment.) Indeed, a tight arithmetic equality standard
can be a boon to the gerrymanderer, because it gives him carte blanche
to ignore traditional boundaries and draw fresh lines with an eye to
political profile data. At the same time, effective restraint on gerrymandering is difficult not only because of continuing doubts concern1. STATE LEGISLATuREs IN AMERICAN PoLincs, American Assembly Essays, (A. Heard
ed. 1966); Reviewed, Dixon, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 604 (1967); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
DFVEOPMENT, MODERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT (Policy Statement 1967).

2.
3.
4.
5.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 1,col. 8, at 42, col. 1.
Wells v. Rockefeller, 281 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris noted 89
S. Cr. 115 (1968); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 279 F. Supp. 952 (W.D.Mo. 1967), prob.
juris noted 390 U.S. 939 (1968).
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ing the justiciability of the issue, but also because proof would be most
difficult even if the justiciability hurdle were surmounted.
Hence, the best assurance of achieving a goal of fair and effective
representation is to focus on apportionment method, in the hope that
effective operation here will obviate the need for placing reliance on
the uncertainties of subsequent review. For many states the answer is
to build political candor, cross-checking, and fairness into their apportionment method by use of bipartisan commissions or related devices.
In the past three years a trend has arisen as several states, recognizing
that nonpartisanship is more a myth than a reality, have turned to the
bipartisan commission idea in their constitutional revision deliberations.
The bipartisan commission concept also obviates, or materially eases,
the need to continue a search for ever-elusive apportionment standards
to channel and supposedly "purify" the discretion of the reapportioners.
Nevertheless, the idea of apportionment standards has a continuing
appeal, and there are a number of apportionment and districting options
which need to be considered by revisers of state constitutions. After
delineating recent bipartisan apportionment methodology, which is
deemed to be of crucial importance, this study concludes with a discussion of apportionment standards and options.
RECENT ATTEMPTS AT BIPARTISANSHIP IN APPORTIONMENT

Since 1966, five states, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Hawaii, have proposed new constitutions containing highly
formalized bipartisan reapportionment provisions. Three, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Hawaii, achieved popular ratification. Special considerations explain the defeat of the draft constitutions in New York and
Maryland. There is no indication that defeat was caused by opposition
to the provisions for bipartisan reapportionment. A sixth state, Florida,
has successfully proposed a new constitution including apportionment
provisions, but with bipartisan provisions substantially lacking. As a
foundation for comparative analysis of these provisions, a brief description of the respective state proposals and their implementation will be
presented at this point.

New Jersey"
In the spring of 1966, a constitutional convention was convened, composed of an equal member of delegates from each party. The conven6. One of the authors of this article has recently published a comprehensive tre-
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tion's permanent apportionment plan proposed a forty-member Senate
which was to be apportioned among the counties by the method used
to apportion the United States Congress.7 A requirement that Senate
districts be composed of one or more whole and contiguous counties
necessitated creation of a predominantly multimember Senate plan, in
view of the additional restraint imposed by the limit on the size of the
body and the applicable equal population requirements." Of fifteen
Senate districts, three were single-members, and the remaining twelve
contained from two to six Senators.
An eighty-member lower house was to be elected from forty two-man
districts. These were created by subdistricting the multi-member Senate
districts, and by adopting the single-member Senate districts. Assembly
districts were to be contiguous' and "as nearly compact and equal in the
number of their inhabitants as possible." 10 A twenty percent maximum
deviation,:" apparently within each Senate district, was ordained for the
two-man Assembly districts.
Finally, the reapportionment function was transferred from the legislature to a bipartisan Apportionment Commission. The state chairmen
of the two parties receiving the largest vote in the preceding gubernatorial election were each to appoint five members to the ten-member
Commission. In the appointment of commissioners, "due regard" was
to be given to geographical dispersion.
ment of reapportionment issues, including a detailed study of the history of reapportionment developments and litigation in the states considered herein, and an analysis of
the reapportionment issues considered below in the discussion of reapportionment
standards and options. See R. DixoN, Dt~mocR.ATic RPRESFNTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAw AND POLITICS (1968) [hereinafter cited as DarocRATIc REPRFSENTATION]. Because of limitations of space, a complete treatment of each state's reapportionment
history cannot be presented. Accordingly, citations are given to the relevant parts of
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION wherein may be found a more detailed study and references to other authorities in the field. For New Jersey, see DEMocnATIc REPRESENrATION
333-40, 381-83, 613-14.
7. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3.
8. See Jackman v. Bodine, 49 N.J. 406, 231 A.2d 193 (1967).
9. A contiguous district is one in which no part of the district is wholly physically
separate from any other part. This "touching" requirement may be waived in instances
where parts of states are separated by water, e.g., the Michigan peninsula and the
islands of Nantuckett and Martha's Vineyard in Massachusetts.
10. A rule of compactness requires that the perimeter of a district be as small and
"regular" in shape as practicable.
11. The maximum percentage deviation is the largest tolerated disparity between the
population of the average or ideal district and the smallest and largest districts, respectively. Thus, given an average district of 10,000 population, a 20 percent maximum
deviation would require that all districts fall within a range of 8,000-12,000.
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The Commission would adopt a plan by majority vote. Failing a
Commission majority, an eleventh member, or "tie breaker," was to be
appointed by the Chief Justice of the state supreme court, in which case
the Commission has an additional month to achieve consensus. All further modification of Senate districts and subdivision into two-member
house districts was to be accomplished by the Commission. The governor is without official power to influence the appointment of the Commission or to participate in or overrule its work.
Of the six states discussed herein,. only New Jersey has implemented
a reapportionment plan pursuant to a new constitution. Vindication of
the convention's decision to provide for a tie breaker was not long
coming. The Commission deadlocked, Professor Marver H. Bernstein,

Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs of Princeton University, was appointed by the New Jersey Chief
Justice, and a plan was soon announced.
Professor Bernstein's plan, adopted by an eight to three vote, effected
a compromise between the interests of the parties in two of the large
counties. Maximum deviations in the Senate and Assembly were
+ 13.5% to 13.8% and + 13.6% to 17.2% respectively. Seven of 15
Senate districts electing 17 of 40 Senators and 14 of 40 assembly districts electing 38 of 80 Assemblymen exceeded a 10 percent deviation
from the average or "ideal" district. The electoral percentages' 2 and
population variance ratios 3 for the Senate and Assembly were 49.1
percent and 1.3 to 1, and 47.3 percent and 1.37 to 1, respectively.
Although the leadership of neither party felt its interests to have been
substantially prejudiced, several suits challenged the plan. The suits
sought elimination of lower house subdistricting, broader use of at-large
voting, and a higher degree of compactness. If the real motivations were
political, which seems likely in the light of some local comment, they
were not overtly disclosed.
The state supreme court required a minor rearrangement of three
12. The electoral percentage is a fiction representing the minimum population theoretically necessary to elect a majority of a legislative house. It is calculated by first
ordering all districts by population, smallest to largest. Second, the populations of
the smallest districts are summed until the legislators representing such districts constitute a majority of the house. The percentage of the total electorate represented by
the population of those districts yields the electoral percentage. An ideal electoral
percentage would be fifty percent (or that which represents one more person than
fifty percent of the electorate).
13. The population variance ratio represents the ratio by which the largest district
exceeds the smallest.
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Senate districts which in return required a revision of the Assembly
districts contained therein. The court effected some of the alterations
itself and extracted the remainder on remand to the Commission.' 4 To
justify its otherwise unexplainable minor "tinkering," the court relied
on the argument that if a more equalized plan in terms of population
variance could be effected without completely undoing the Commission's work, such revision is required. 15
The court's decision rejected the raison d' etre of the bipartisan commission. It noted that "so-called community interests, partisan history,
and residence of incumbents . . . are wholly irrelevant to the subject
and cannot support deviations of any kind." IcThe court concluded that
"[o]ur attention is not called to any other consideration that could conceivably support the discrepancies here involved." 17
On review of the remand to the Commission, the court noted that
"the parties acknowledge that the plans were prepared without any
awareness of the political complexion of the proposed districts." I Without such knowledge the political fairness of the proposed plans remains
a matter of chance, and a primary raison d' etre for using bipartisanship
collapses. 19
Maryland2
In the fall and early winter of 1967-1968, a constitutional convention
convened and proposed a sweeping revision of Maryland's reapportionment procedures. Although there was some controversy over the abolition of multimember districting, other issues were the primary causes
of defeat of the proposed constitution when it was submitted as a unit
to a referendum in the spring of 1968.
The proposed reapportionment plan would have limited the size of
the House of Delegates to 120 members with the Senate to be one-third
14. Jackman v. Bodine, 50 NJ. 127, 232 A.2d 419 (1967).
15. The revision reduced the population of the three Senate districts from +13.6%,
+9.2%, and -13.8% to +6.1%, +2.5%, and -3.5%, respectively. The overall electoral
percentage was increased to 50.2%.
16. Jackman v. Bodine, 49 N.J. at -, 231 A.2d at 200.
17. Id. at -, 231 A.2d at 198
18. Jackman v. Bodine, 50 NJ. at-, 232 A.2d at 420.
19. The consideration of precisely such information was permitted and encouraged
by Chief Judge William J. Campbell (N.D. Ill.) in obtaining a substantial settlement

through the case of the bipartisan pre-trial conference device. See
SENTATION, supra

DEMOCRATC REPRE-

note 6, at 310-13.

20. See generally DEMOCRATIC

RERESERmNATION,

supra note 6, at 217-26, 382-83, 607.
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the size of the House. Each Senate district would be divided into three
Assembly districts with all legislators being elected from single-member
districts of "substantially equal" population. Traditional contiguity and
compactness provisions were included, as were admonitions to give
"due regard" for "natural boundaries" and "boundaries of political subdivisions."
A bipartisan commission was delegated the reapportionment function.
Its members were appointed by the majority and minority leaders of
each house (two each) with the ninth member being appointed by the
governor. No commissioner could hold a popularly elected state office
at the time of his appointment.
The commission was to meet six months prior to the convening of the
General Assembly and, by majority vote, to adopt a plan which would
be sent first to the governor and then to the Assembly on the day it
convened. The Assembly was to have seventy days in which to overrule
the commission's plan by substituting its own. Significantly, a legislative substitution would be subject to a gubernatorial veto.
The proposal authorized review of both commission and legislative
plans by the Maryland court of appeals, the state's highest court. Invalidation of a legislative substitute plan would automatically reinstitute
the commission plan, if valid. Invalidation of a commission plan would
require the court to provide "appropriate relief for the conduct of the
impending election."
The plan eventually adopted by the convention constituted a marked
departure from that proposed by a pre-convention Constitutional Convention Commission draft.2 ' The rejected pre-convention draft placed
the reapportionment function in both the legislature and the governor,
but primarily in the latter. The draft provided that reapportionment was
to begin by the submission of a gubernatorial plan to the legislature. Although such a plan was subject to legislative substitution, such a choice
was required to be made before a date four months prior to the coming
general election. A legislative failure to agree on a substitute would
cause the governor's pertinent plan to become law. In addition, any
legislative plan would have been subject to a gubernatorial veto. Thus,
it would require an extraordinary legislative majority to enact any
plan opposed by the governor.
Another significant difference between the draft submitted to the
convention and the plan presented for the referendum was in the na21.

REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION

127-29 (Mo. 1967).
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ture of the districts. The pre-convention draft permitted multimember
districting in both houses but limited senate and house districts to two
and six members respectively, The plan finally adopted required singlemember districting for both houses.
A final difference between the two plans concerned the degree of
population equality required. The pre-convention draft would have
required district population to be "as nearly equal as practicable," although the drafters had rejected a requirement of maximum deviations
of not more than five percent. The final plan substituted the arguably
more flexible requirement of "substantially equal" districts. The latter
expression was thought to be less susceptible of equation with "as
nearly equal as possible," a concept which would invite perpetual litigation.
2
Pennsylvani =

In the spring of 1968, several amendments to the Pennsylvania constitution proposed by a constitutional convention were approved by a
popular referendum, including an amendment providing for a revision
of the constitution's reapportionment article. A constitutional convention had proposed a senate of fifty members and a lower house of 203
representatives. Single-member districts were required in both houses
which were to be of "compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in
population as practicable." "Unless absolutely necessary," local political
subdivisions were not to be divided.
The bipartisan commission created for Pennsylvania was to consist of
five members-the majority and minority leaders of each house or their
deputies, plus a fifth member to be selected within forty-five days by the
other four members. Failure thus to select a fifth member creates the
necessity of his selection by a majority of the state supreme court. The
fifth member may not be a salaried holder of public office at the time
of his appointment.
Failure of the commission to come forth with a valid plan necessitates judicial reapportionment by a majority of the state supreme court.
In addition, any plan proposed by the commission is subject to several
notice requirements, including publication of relevant mathematical
data and maps of all districts prior to validation.
22. See generally DFmocTIAzc

REPREsENTATION,

TORY COMMITTEE REFERENCE MANUAL No.

1967).

6,

supra

note 6, at 382, 620; PREPARA-

LEGISIATIVE APPORTIONMENT

41-59 (Pa.
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The bipartisan character of the newly adopted reapportionment procedures was not a feature of plans of several groups submitting their
views to the convention. Plans submitted by the AFL-CIO, the Pennsylvania ADA chapter, and the Pennsylvania Bar Association and testimony offered by the League of Women Voters all advocated placing
the reapportionment functions in the legislature.
In addition, a twenty percent maximum deviation requirement was
suggested, but not adopted. Finally, legislative failure to reapportion
would have required judicial reapportionment by the state supreme
court in all plans but that submitted by the ADA. The ADA plan provided for an intermediate stage prior to recourse to the supreme court,
whereby the issue would be submitted to a reapportionment commission
consisting of the governor and the majority and minority leaders of
each house. Arguably, such a commission would provide for no more
than gubernatorial reapportionment.
New York23
Because of rather violent opposition to proposed constitutional provisions designed to weaken the principle of separation of church and
state and permit more direct aid to parochial schools, a proposed new
constitution was rejected by New York voters in November, 1967.
Because of insistence by the convention leadership (particularly Assembly Speaker Anthony J. Travia) that the proposed constitution be
voted on as a whole, a new reapportionment article was defeated along
with the more controversial provisions.
The proposed reapportionment plan would have created a Senate of
sixty members and an Assembly of 150 to be elected from single-member districts of contiguous and compact territory and with populations
"as equal as practicable." Due regard was to have been given to natural
geographical and political boundaries; gerrymandering and city block
division were prohibited.
The reapportionment function would have been vested in a redistricting commission of five members appointed, one each, by the
majority and minority leaders of each house and by the chairman (chief
23. See generally DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, supra note 4, at 201-08, 349-62, 615-17;
COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs, BRIEFING PAPR No. 2 ON "STtuCrURE OF GovERNMENT,"

(Feb. 20, 1967)

(R. Peter Strauss and Robert B. McKay, co-chairmen);

COMMITTEE ON THE LEGISLATURE, MINORITY REPORT TO CONVENTION ON "APPORTIONING
AND DISTRICTING AGENCY," (August 1, 1967) (Leonard B. Sand, chairman, Sub-Com-

mittee on Apportionment) [hereinafter cited as MINORITY

REPORT].
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judge) of the court of appeals, the state's highest court. No member of
the legislature would have been eligible to serve on the commission. A
plan certified by a majority of the commission would have had the
force of law, subject to challenge in the court of appeals.
By adopting the above plan, the convention rejected appeals by the
New York Times and the minority members of the Committee on the
24
Legislature to create a plan providing for a nonpartisan commission,
and also rejected a request by Governor Rockefeller to allow the
governor to appoint some commissioners. In addition, the convention
rejected the majority report of the committee, which proposed to vest
the reapportionment function in the legislature not subject to gubernatorial veto.
The nominally nonpartisan plan would have provided that four
commission members be appointed, one each, by the four above-mentioned legislative leaders from a list of thirty-six candidates nominated,
six each, by the presidents of six universities in the state. The four
appointees would elect a fifth by majority vote. No person holding a
party or public office could be appointed.
The Governor's suggestion would have increased the commission
membership to nine, and would have permitted the governor and court
of appeals to appoint five members between them.
Hawaif
The most recent creation of a bipartisan reapportionment process
occurred in Hawaii with popular approval of a constitutional convention proposal on November 5, 1968. The new plan creates a Senate of
twenty-five members and a lower house of fifty-one members, apportioned on a registered voter basis. Legislators are to be apportioned
among the basic island units, generally in multimember districts of
compact and contiguous territory. Representative districts are to be
24. Under one version, although the purpose was announced as "nonpartisan," there
was a dash of bipartisan flavor. State university presidents would nominate a panel of
thirty-six, none of whom could hold public office or office in any political party. From
this panel the four partisan leaders in the legislature (presiding officers and minority
leaders of each house) would each select one name, and the four so selected would
select the tie breaker who would also serve as chairman. See MINoRiTy REPoRT, supra
note 3.
25. See generally DE.NocRATnc REPmrEmmN , supra note 6, at 114-15, 478-80,
599-600 for background. For recent development see 1968 amendments to HAWAI
CoNsr., art. III, S 2-4, and explanatory comment in CoMNnoN COMMiiEE oN
LrutsrArnv APPoRTIoNMENT, REPoRT No. 58 (Hawaii Sept. 10, 1968).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:888

formed wholly from senatorial districts, and no district may contain
more than four members.
As a further assurance of minority representation, the plan provides
that "where practicable, submergence of an area in a larger district
wherein substantially different socio-economic interests predominate
shall be avoided." A seemingly contradictory criterion provides, however, that "no district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or
political faction." The latter provision focuses attention in the wrong
direction, on districts taken separately, rather than on the representation plan as a whole. It would seem to bar the creation of a homogeneous district for a minority which otherwise would have no voice.
The contradiction in the two quoted provisions stems from the fact
that these two criteria take opposite approaches to the same practice. The
former encourages the commission to take into account the disparate
"socio-economic interests" (a euphemism for "political interests")
present within a given area. The latter criterion, however, appears to
prohibit any action based upon a recognition of those very interests.
It may be argued that the contradiction is more apparent than real
by distinguishing the use of "socio-economic" in the former and "political" in the latter. The distinction appears specious. A further rationalization would be to argue that the term "unduly favor" was used advisedly to mean that a requirement of reasonableness would serve to
limit unduly partisan districting while the same requirement would
still permit the commission to take into consideration the effect its decisions would have on any political minority. The real explanation for
the contradiction, unfortunately, may be that it simply escaped the
notice of its author and all those at the convention which proposed it.
Because districts must be "as nearly equal in population as practicable," and because of the adherence to basic island groups as representation units, adequate representation of the lesser-populated island
units was achieved by providing that in no case should an island group
receive fewer than two Senators and three Representatives. Because
of the limit on the size of the legislative bodies, however, it was necessary
concurrently to devise a fractional voting system.26 Thus, the senators
or representative delegations of any island unit so augmented beyond
their population entitlement shall exercise a fractional vote; the numerator being the number initially allocated and the denominator being
26. For a review of weight and fractional voting devices see DEMOCRATIC REPREsupra note 6, at 516-20

SENTATION,

1969]

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

the minimum specified. In this way the underpopulated island units have
an augmented "voice" in legislative affairs, including committee membership, but their "vote" in the legislature is limited to their population
weight.
A bipartisan commission was delegated the reapportionment function.
The president of the Senate and the speaker of the House are each to
appoint two members. A member of the minority party of each house is
selected by his party to appoint two each. The eight thus chosen are to
select a ninth by a three-fourths majority vote. Failure to so select the
final member in this manner shall result in his selection by a majority
of the state supreme court. The ninth member shall also serve as
chairman.
In addition to appointing the commission members, each of the four
appointing authorities shall also appoint from each island unit a person
to serve on an advisory council from that island unit. These advisory
councils would be without voting power, but would serve in an advisory capacity to the commission during its existence. Finally, no
commission member may seek legislative office during the first two elections under the commission's plan.

Florida:Continwmce of the TraditionalMold"
The reapportionment article of the constitutional revision approved
by Florida voters in November, 1968, is more traditional in character in
that it vests the reapportionment function in the legislature. It has no
bipartisan features, but there is no indication that some variety of bipartisan device was ever seriously considered. A senate of 30 to 40
members and a house of 80 to 120 members were created, all of which
members were to be elected from single-member districts "of either
contiguous, overlapping or identical territory."
In the event of legislative failure to reapportion, a special thirty-day
apportionment session is to be convened by the governor. Legislative
failure in the special session will result in reapportionment by the state
supreme court. There are no meaningful standards to guide the discretion of either the legislature or the court.
Specific procedures are provided whereby any legislative plan
would be promptly reviewed by the court at the instance of the attor27. FLA. CoNsr. art. III, §§ 1, 16 (1968); M. DAURE, C. DONOVAN AND G. KAMmfERER, SoULD FLORIDA ADoPT THE PROPOSED 1968 CONSTTUTION? UNVERSITY op FLORIDA
PUBLic

ADmINISTATON

REPRES NTATION,

PAMPHLEr No. 31 (1968).

supra note 6, at 444-46, 596-97.

For background see DEMOCRATC
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ney general seeking a declaratory judgment of validity. Invalidation
would necessitate the prompt convening of a special session to last fifteen days. Should the legislature again propose an invalid plan or fail
to act, the reapportionment would be made by the supreme court.
The only notable aspects of the new Florida plan are the manner in
which definite deadlines are set and enforced, and the requirement of
single-member districting.28 It has been said that the legislature "flunked
its finals" in preparing the new constitution, but it is unclear whether
the comment was meant to include the reapportionment provision. 29
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT STANDARDS AND OPTIONS:

AN ANALYSIS

Although recent constitutional revisions have accorded a substantial
measure of discretion to bipartisan commissions (or to legislatures), such
authority has not been delegated without certain standards or guidelines.
The first is the base upon which reapportionment will be effected. Other
standards relate to population equality, the pattern, size and nature of
legislative districts, and certain provisions protecting against gerrymandering and insuring minority representation.

Apportionment Base
The apportionment base may range from the traditional and broadest
base of total population to the most restricted permissible base of registered voters.30 In between are the citizen population and qualified
voter bases. Although all of these bases have been validated by federal
courts for at least one state,31 total population has been the most commonly used standard. The only base to be declared invalid has been one
predicated upon voter turnout in a particular election. 2
As noted above, census or total population is the broadest base, and
includes all located within the district without regard to citizenship or
28. The effectuation of a valid plan without undue delay was an especially acute
problem in Florida. See Swann v. Adams, 383 U.S. 210 (1966).
29. Public Administration Pamphlet No. 31, supra note 27, at 41 (conclusion of

Kammerer).
30. DFmocRA-nc REPRESENTATION, sulpra note 6, at 501-03.
31. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (Hawaii registered voters); WMCA
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (N.Y.-citizen population); Baker v. Carr, 247
F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (qualified voters); Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873
(D. Vt. 1965) (registered voters).
32. WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Klahr v.
Goddard, 250 F. Supp. 537, 547 (D. Ariz. 1966).
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status as a voter. To the extent a legislator is viewed as one charged with
representing the views of all those in his district affected by a legislative decision, the broadest possible base would be most appropriate.
In addition, such a base does not suffer from the defect that transient
elements of the population may go unrepresented or uncounted.
The adoption of more restricted bases indicate a concern that certain
elements physically located within a district not be counted so as to
distort the representative 'weight given a certain district. For example,
since such elements of the population as military personnel, college students, and institutional inmates may be ineligible to vote in a given
district, it is argued that they should not be counted for the purpose of
reapportioning legislators since the same considerations that apply to
voting qualification arguably apply to legislative representation in these
special instances.
The choice among the various bases is not one of the more important issues because in most instances the various possible apportionment bases have only a slight differential impact on districting results.
Any choice is reasonable, i.e., not unconstitutional, with the possible exception of the use of either the registered voter or qualified voter base
in those states having a history of denying the franchise to a resident
minority.
PopulationEquality
The degree of inter-district population equality required has been
the one reapportionment standard substantially circumscribed by court
decisions. Yet the Supreme Court's first requirement of substantial
equality 3 has remained unchanged, although it has apparently been subject to re-evaluation.34
Since absolute population equality has not yet been made a constitutional mandate, 35 it would seem best not to write such a requirement
into state statutes. To do so would substantially lessen the flexibility of
other provisions necessary to implement full and fair representation.
To do so also would invite perpetual litigation because every plan now in
force could arguablyibe made more "equal." 36
Provisions requiring apportionment "as nearly equal as may be," or
33. Revnolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967)
335. But see cases cited supra note 5.
ith Jackman v.
36. Compare, Jackman v. Bodine, 49 NJ. 406, 231 A.2d 193 (1967)
Bodine, 50 N.J. 127, 232 A.2d 419 (1967).
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"as nearly equal as practicable," should be avoided as being too sus-

ceptible to interpretations of "as nearly equal as possible." A requirement of "substantial equality" would be more in keeping with both the
Supreme Court standard and the goal of fair and effective representation
for all groups in the light of the realities of residence distribution. Such

a standard would permit deviation of five percent, ten percent, or possibly even fifteen percent where required to effectively represent the
total spectrum of the electorate. The great majority of plans now in
force contain at least some districts exceeding a ten percent limit; many
exceed a twenty percent deviation from average limit. 7 Accordingly,

rigidly small maximum deviation requirements should be avoided. Only
Maryland, however, sought to incorporate the more flexible "substantial
equality" standard.

DistrictPatterns
All recent plans have incorporated the traditional restrictions on the
shape or boundaries of legislative districts. These include requirements
of continuity, compactness, and adherence, where practicable, to natural geographical and political subdivision boundaries.3 8
The. contiguity requirement-that no part of one district be completely separated from any other part of the same district-has been
universally accepted and poses no enforcement problem or serious
challenge to reapportioning flexibility.
The requirement of compactness-that districts be as symmetrical as
practicable-is equally innocuous on its face, and may present a certain
restraint on gerrymandering. 9 However, a rigid adherence to this requirement should be avoided, because a district pattern of symmetrical
squares, although conceivable, could well operate to submerge a significant element of the electorate. As a practical matter, absolute compactness (districts forming perfect circles) is an impossibility. Furthermore,
a benign gerrymander, in the sense of some asymetrical districts, may
well be required in order to assure representation of submerged elements
within a larger area.
37. The relevant mathematical calculations for the plans, past and present, of all
states are set forth in DEMOCRATIC REPREsENTAOrON, supra note 6, at 589-628.
38. See generally, supra 6, at 456-99.
39. An interesting mathematical test for calculating compactness is presented in
Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of "Compactness,"
50 MiNe. L. Rav. 443 (1966). The thesis presented therein is subject to several criticisms. See DamocaATm c REPRESENTATON, supra note 6, at 460-61.
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For example, assume that an area is subdistricted into four singlemember districts that there is a fifty percent white Republican population evenly spread over the area and that a twenty-five percent white
and Negro Democratic population is fairly well concentrated, although
subject to separation. In such a hypothetical case, four symmetrical
districts may so divide the minority votes that four Republican legislators would be elected. An informed and deft, yet legitimate, creation
of less symmetrical districts would then be required to produce a 2-1-2
split. It would seem that the choice between the alternatives of district
symmetry and effective representation would not be a difficult one. The
above considerations would also seem to apply to the requirement of
adherence to certain natural or political boundaries or the requirement
that city blocks not be divided. Where it is impossible to follow both a
political boundary and a natural boundary, it is assumed that the political
line would be followed.
In conclusion, requirements affecting the physical appearance of a
district's shape may have some relevance but should not be controlling.
Such requirements focus on form rather than the substance of effective
political representation. The prospect of the tail wagging the dog may
be avoided by inclusion of the modifier "where practicable" in each of
these requirements.
Single-member vs. Multimember Districts
Of the six states involved in this study, two states retained a past
practice of single-member districting (Pennsylvania and New York),
two retained multimember districting (Hawaii and New Jersey), and
two rejected their tradition of multimember districting and required
complete single-member districting (Maryland and Florida). This significant preference for single-member districting, also exemplified
in other states since 1964, demonstrates a realization of certain deficiencies and inequities inherent in the multimember system notwithstanding the arguments traditionally made in its behalf.4 1
Advocates of the multimember system argue that its adoption would
minimize gerrymandering, provide a means of preserving county-wide
physical integrity, or other area interests, and minimize the "localism"
and lobbying that may have been brought to bear on a legislator repre40. E.g., Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.

41. See generally DEMOCRATIC
cited therein.

REPrsmENTATION,

supra note 6, at 504-07 and authorities
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senting a smaller constituency. Such benefits are substantially offset,
however, by factors militating against their salutary effect. First,
gerrymandering is probably enhanced rather than restricted by a multimember system. For example, the winner-take-all effect of at-large
multimember districting may serve to elect four Democrats in an area
having a forty percent Republican minority. Subdistricting could provide at least one, and perhaps two, Republican legislators if subdistricted into four single-member districts.4
Second, a mixed multimember and single-member plan operates in
favor of the multimember district resident since he will be influencing
the vote of more legislators who will be in a position to cast the deciding
ballot on any given legislative vote. Mathematical analysis leads to the
conclusion that such representation more than overcomes the apparent
deficiency that the legislator elected from a multimember district must
be responsible to more constituents. A multimember system of exclusively two-man districts would, of course, eliminate the discrepancies
inherent in the mixed system or one in which multimember districts
varied in size.4s
On balance, the multimember system seems best suited only for
situations such as that presented in Hawaii, where it serves to preserve
the integrity of units of common interest or other situations in which
single-member districting could not easily be accomplished. The choice
of single-member districting, therefore, would protect against the
"clean-sweep" tendency in multimember systems, and would preserve
the relative equality of voter influence of legislative outcomes.
The ReapportionmentAgencies"
Perhaps the single most important contribution of recent state constitutional revision in the field of reapportionment has been the stated
preference for bipartisan commission reapportionment. Of the six
attempted revisions since 1966 reviewed here, only Florida chose to
vest the reapportionment function in the legislature, while none gave
the governor a controlling role. Legislative and gubernatorial functions
42. Compare, Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) 'with Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73 (1966) and Fortsom v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
43. The advantages given the residents of larger multimember districts over residents of single member or smaller multimember districts has been the subject of extensive and sophisticated mathematical analysis. Banzhaf, Multimember Electoral Districts-Do they Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle,75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
44. See generally DEMOcRATIc REPRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 300-62, 380-84,
450-51.
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have been limited, in general, to appointive powers, although a commission's plan may be overruled by the Maryland General Assembly
within a certain period, and legislator service on the Pennsylvania
commission is not prohibited.
The choice of bipartisan commissions has substantial justification,
given the inherent deficiencies of legislative and gubernatorial dominance, and the virtual nonexistence of the animal called the "nonpartisan." 45 A bipartisan agency would seem to best assure the necessary
combination of fair and effective representation without undue political
favoritism and the political realism necessary to perform what is a
most political function.
Legislative dominance of the reapportionment function is too often
tantamount to a defendant's self-determination of his guilt or innocence. At best, it is unrealistic to expect a body to legislate against its
own interests. There can be46 little other explanation for the past legislative refusal to reapportion.
Moreover, mere insistance upon certain deadlines for legislative reapportionment will insure little more than that a plan will be forthcoming. Absent a fortuitous division in party control of the two
legislative houses, or of the legislature and state house, there is little
assurance that any plan will do more than protect the interests of the
majority party.
Provision for gubernatorial dominance of the reapportionment function is hardly a better solution, for in the first instance, the governor is
the most successful partisan in the state,47 and in the second, there may
be a partisan investiture much less broad than that represented by the
legislature.
Although there may be some appeal to giving the governor a role
to play in the reapportionment process because he might be thought
to be expressing a "state-wide view," such a provision would be difficult
to work out in practice. Granting the state's chief executive substantial
powers could not be done without undermining the principle of bipartisan balance, unless he were to share appointive or membership powers
with the legislative partisans of his own party. Such a proposal might
45. Supra note 6, at 532-35 and authorities cited therein.
46. Legislative nonaction respecting reapportionment of up to sixty years was nor
rare. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama); Baker v. Carr, 247 F. Supp.
629 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (Tennessee).
47. For a comparison of the "strong-governor" systems, see the discussion of Alaska,
Arkansas, Ohio, and Missouri in DEmociiAnc REPRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 369-70,
368-70, 364-68, 331-33, respectively
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invite intra-party conflict. However, the governor could and probably
should be given the power to veto any legislative substitute for a commission plan. Such a provision would protect the commission's plan from
casual rejection by a bare legislative majority, and would have the
salutary effect of ensuring that the bipartisan basis and nature of the

new reapportionment would be preserved.
Use of a "nonpartisan" commission applying "nonpartisan" principles
provides little more assurance of fair and effective political representation than do plans with legislative or gubernatorial dominance. Apparently, such a commission would be concerned solely with census
tracts, natural and political subdivision boundaries, and district symmetry. The product of its labors might be a reapportionment fully

representing all interests. Such a result, however, would be purely
fortuitous. Consideration of the same "nonpolitical" factors, and a re-

fusal to consider political data, could as well result in an unintended
submersion of the interests of one party or faction. It may be surmised
that a ninth grade civics class equipped with a map and a desk calculator

could do as well; indeed, one experienced reapportioner has said as
much.

48

The foregoing discussion assumes, however, that the "nonpartisans"
will be just that. This is to assume that knowledgeable men are either
without political leanings, or are able to suppress them to the possible
detriment of their political faith. Such assumptions are unrealistic at
best. Indeed, political disputation seldom wages hotter than in academia-the very place to which proponents of "nonpartisanship" tend
to look for candidates for commission positions. The better alternative
would be to candidly admit that reapportioners deal with the heart of
the political process, and will best serve their function by insuring that
the political impact of any reapportionment will be to fully and fairly
represent all concerned.4 9
Acceptance and adoption of the bipartisan commission principle alone
will not provide a panacea for all reapportionment problems, however,
since the composition, selection and procedures of the commission are
equally important.
The recent experience has been to appoint a commission of from five
to eleven members, all but one of whom are concededly partisans.
48. Address by A. Robert Kleiner, Democratic member, Michigan Bipartisan Apportionment Commission, to the National Municipal League, Boston, 1966.
49. Dmr ocaxrc REPRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 310-13.
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Appointment of the partisan members has been by political party leaders,
who are unrestricted in their choice, except that (1) in Pennsylvania
the legislative leaders of each party are themselves the commission; (2)
in Maryland no holder of a popularly elected office may be appointed;
and (3) in Hawaii no member of the commission may run for legislative office in the first two elections after reapportionment. Hence, only
in Maryland is there a flat prohibition on legislators' serving on the
commission and only in Hawaii is there a provision exacting the price of
temporary noncandidacy for legislative office as a condition of service
on the commission.
Appointment of the last member of the commission is made by
the governor in one instance (Maryland's defeated plan), by those
already appointed in two instances, with further provision for appointment by the state supreme court when the members are unable
to agree on a tie-breaker (Pennsylvania and Hawaii), by the full bench
of the state's highest court (New York's defeated plan), or by the state's
chief justice, but only after the commission deadlocks over competing
plans (New Jersey). In all instances the partisan members are equally
divided among the two major parties;50 in all instances the commissions
act by majority vote in determining the apportionment plan.
There is much merit in a plan providing for a commission of nine
or eleven members, all but one of whom would be appointed by legislative or other state political leaders. By virtue of each party being
represented, the unavoidably political process of apportionment and
districting would be brought into the open and "fairness"-certainly an
improvement over partisan unfairness-would be a product of party
negotiation in the context of full disclosure of political realities. The
last member, or tiebreaker, would be elected by a majority of the state's
highest court. Selection of the tiebreaker in this manner would minimize partisan considerations and suspicions present when the tiebreaker
is appointed by the governor alone, or by the state's chief justice alone.
Selection by the full bench of the state's highest court can serve to
50. Quaere whether the following language in Hawaii's plan would operate to produce an exception to this statement:
The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the house . . . shall each
select two members. Members of each house belonging to the party
or parties different from that of the president or the speaker shall designate one of their members for each house and the two so designated shall
each select two members of the commission. The eight members so selected
shall ... select ... the ninth member who shall serve as chairman of the
commission.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:888

instill a popular faith in the selection process and induce a more ready
acceptance of the final product.
The several benefits of the bipartisan commission-tie breaker mode
of apportionment-including the added possibilty that a plan so devised
might be entitled to an extra presumption of validity on appeal-outweigh the danger that the legislative leaders who appoint the partisan
commissioners will be individiously parochial and self-serving. Certainly, such a danger is nothing compared to the traditional alternative
of straight partisan apportionment by the majority party in the legislature. Furthermore, any supposed risk can be minimized if desired (a)
by shifting the power to appoint the partisan members of the bipartisan commission to the state central committee of each major
party, as in New Jersey's plan; or (b) by providing that none of the
members of the commission can be legislators, as in Maryland's defeated plan; or (c) by allowing legislators to serve, but barring their
reelection for a specified period, as in Hawaii's plan.
Provisions permitting appointment of members by partisans, but restricting the choice to nonlegislators, ensures an informed body, thus
safeguarding against blatant or unintended gerrymanders, and yet ensures one whose members are without prospect of immediate personal
political benefit. To reduce the influence of the legislative leaders, per
se, appointive power could be vested in the party legislative caucus, as
an alternative to shifting the appointive power from the legislature to
the state party committees.
Although all recent provisions permit action on an apportionment
plan by majority vote, consideration could be given to requiring extraordinary majorities of six (of a nine-member commission) or seven (of
an eleven-member commission) for adoption of a final plan. Although
the possibility of commission failure may appear to be increased with
this variation of the simple bipartisan commission-tiebreaker idea, the
prospect of a certain and perhaps uninformed judicial reapportionment
could be sufficient to induce a reasonable compromise. The benefit of
'this variation would be to broaden the consensus basis for the plan
finally approved, and minimize the possibility of simple partisan deadlock
broken only by the tiebreaker's exasperation.
Arguably also, equal representation of the political parties on the bipartisan commission should be required even in those states in which
one party has achieved a position of relative dominance. Such a provision would tend to insure that a one and one-half party state does not
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become a one-party state. In the normal course of events the tiebreaker
always would be from the dominant party anyway, and thus, given the
standards already discussed, the legitimate interests of the dominant
party would not be jeopardized. If its voters remained loyal, it would
still rule the state. As an alternative, and certainly better than partisan
apportionment by the legislature, one-party states could adapt the commission device by utilizing a formula designed always to vest commission
control in the majority party, but giving a voice to the minority party.
For example, the majority party in the legislature (or state party committee) could appoint more commissioners than the minority party.
Vesting power to appoint additional commissioners in the governor
might not ensure dominant party control of the commission because of
recent tendencies to elect Republican governors in some Southern states
which are still, for most purposes, one-party or one-and-one-half party
Democratic states. Even such a modified commission device-the modification perhaps being the realistic price of political acceptance-would
at least have the virtue of bringing the apportionment process into the
open.
An additional alternative, designed to take account of the third party
or faction situation, is to provide that any party polling a specified percentage of the vote is the last legislative election may appoint a number
of commissioners equal to those appointed by the major parties. In
November, 1968, Montgomery County, Maryland, ratified a county
charter containing such a provision for county council apportionmentwith the added provision that the additional member (intended as tiebreaker presumably) would be appointed by the council itself.l 1 The
charter amendment authorizes appointment of three apportionment
commissioners by any party polling at least fifteen per cent of the total
vote cast for all candidates for the council in the last regular election.
If there were no minor parties, such a provision would operate as a
bipartisan commission device, with the tiebreaker being appointed by
51. Charter of Montgomery County, Maryland, art. I, § 104 (Nov. 1968) which
reads in part as follows:
* ' ' Whenever district boundaries are to be reestablished the council
shall appoint... a commission on redistricting composed of three members
from each political party chosen from a list of five names submitted
by the Central Committee [a local body] of each political party which
polled at least fifteen percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for
the Council in the last preceding regular election. The Council shall
appoint one additional member of the Commission.. . . No person shall
be eligible for appointment to the Commission if he holds any elected
office.
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the party controlling the sitting council. However, if there were
a minor party, the spectre arises of commission control being vested in
the six members (three each) appointed by the second party and the
splinter party, rather than the four members appointed by the dominant
party (three appointed by the party itself, plus the one seat gained by
virtue of controlling the council and appointing the "tiebreaker").
Obviously, additional thought is needed before departing from the
conventional bipartisan commission mode and venturing in the direction just discussed, giving equal voice to each "fifteen percent faction."
Consideration also should be given to the question whether the Supreme
Court's ordering Ohio to place George C. Wallace and his American
Independent Party on that state's 1968 presidential ballot in any way
gives rise to a principle that minor parties have a right to representation on apportionment commissions. 2
The short answer would be to say that the Wallace case involved
access to the ballot to stand for election to public office, whereas an
apportionment commission is a non-elective device to discharge a
special pre-election function. However, the contours of the "one manone vote" principle, still in the developmental stage, are too uncertain to
permit a definitive answer.
CONCLUSION

Paradoxically, the model of the kind of legislature most persons-and
most plaintiffs in reapportionment cases-would deem to be ideal, is the
proportional representation model. All parties and groups would be
represented in the state legislature roughly in proportion to their statewide voting strength. Chief Justice Earl Warren may have had something of the sort in mind when he wrote in Reynolds v. Sims that "fair
and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic
aim of legislative apportionment." 1;
Yet, this ideal of giving each major group in the state a proportional
voice in the state legislature can be achieved with assurance only by
abolishing both districting and at-large voting and using a formal proportional representation system, such as the party list system common in
Europe. There are many reasons, beyond the realm of the present discussion, for not going all the way to the "PR" form of legislative elections. But so long as this ideal persists there will always be tension be52. Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct.5 (1968).
53. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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tween the inexactness of the share of seats awarded to a given party
under an apportionment-districting system of legislative election, and
the share a party feels is its just due when it compares the votes it won
with the number of seats it gained.
Endless fussing with apportionment standards can do little to reduce
this inexactness and tension. Informed use of the bipartisan commission device, combining both political realism and cross-checking for fairness, can reduce the inexactness and ameliorate the tension. Indeed, to
reject formal proportional representation devices in favor of our traditional apportionment-districting systems of legislative election, without
opting also for a bipartisan reapportionment device, is to evidence again
that curious mixture of political innocence and political cynicism which
has always served to mystify foreign observers of the American scene
from De Toqueville to De Gaulle.

